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Bulls, bears, and ballclubs
the boston celtics pro basketball team
has returned around 20 percent to its investors
each year since becoming the first publicly
traded professional sports franchise in 1986—
until this September, when it was sold to a pri-
vate owner. Why don’t more teams go pub-
lic, and why don’t public teams tend to last?
Other teams have also sold public stock,
with varying degrees of success. Football’s
Green Bay Packers have sold shares four times
since the 1920s, and sales have exceeded ex-
pectations each time, even though sharehold-
ers receive no dividends and can only sell the
stock back to the team for 2.5 cents per share.
Baseball’s Cleveland Indians offered stock in
June 1998. Though the stock immediately
tanked, initial investors realized a return of 48
percent when the team was sold in November
1999. Hockey’s Florida Panthers were pub-
licly owned until June 2001, and did well only
after acquiring hotels and resorts. Business
Week called the team “a drag on earnings,”
and shares in Boca Resorts Inc., the team’s
former owner, rose after the team was sold.
Team owners have pitched their IPOs as a
way of getting the community involved, en-
suring that franchises do not move to other
cities against the wishes of their fans. The
funds raised in public stock offerings can help
pay for high-salaried star players or improve-
ments to aging stadiums, or even for fran-
chises themselves (especially in the minor
leagues, where frequently no single buyer can
afford to purchase the entire team). 
Sale prices for franchises have always in-
creased, providing investors with a good re-
turn if the franchise is sold. But sales are rare,
and otherwise team stock performs poorly;
sports franchises offer little potential for
growth, and gate receipts and local television
revenue are too reliant upon success on the
field. Also, shareholders are usually limited in
their decision-making involvement since few
teams are majority publicly owned. (Only 48
percent of Celtics stock was publicly
held, for example.) Short-term in-
vestors seem to buy stock in public
franchises for the same reason the
wealthy buy whole teams—owning a
team is a status symbol.
Investors can make money on sports fran-
chises if they are willing to hold on to the team
until it is sold or adds other profitable assets.
But fans looking to be more involved with
their favorite team might do better to buy sea-
son tickets. For about the same cost, they’d at
least get to attend the games.
—Matt Rutledge
Racing for gold
Marathon training typically entails four months of preparation, running an average
of 25 miles per week and up to 40 miles in a given week. Sound tiring? Many peo-
ple make an additional commitment to dedicate their run to a good cause, raising
thousands of dollars for charity.
Nonprofit fundraisers linked with endurance athletic events have taken off run-
ning over the past decade. In 2002, 6.5 percent of Boston’s marathoners represent-
ed a charity, raising $6.8 million—a $1 million increase from 2001. Yet long before
runners compete in the race, the organizations must compete for a position. Each
year, the Boston Marathon charity program, at the starting line since the mid-
1990s, handpicks 15 nonprofit organizations from about 60 applicants. The non-
profits that secure race numbers usually require marathoners to raise a minimum
of $2,000, using personal credit card information to bind the agreement.
Although $2,000 might seem like a daunting obligation, spots are in high
demand since the alternative way to earn an official Boston number is to complete
a qualifying marathon at a 10-minute mile pace. Plus, charity runners often reap
benefits beyond the numbers pinned to their shirts. The Dana-Farber Marathon
Challenge (DFMC), subsidizing innovative cancer research, provides a training pro-
gram supervised by former Boston Marathon champion Jack Fultz, weekly group
runs, access to local facilities, and an
indoor meeting area at the start and finish
lines. These perks may explain why DFMC
receives twice as many applications as its
300-plus allocated spaces. Not to ignore
the cause: the average Dana-Farber runner
raises twice the minimum, reflecting the
value they place on cancer research and
this experience.
For the runners, the marathon is about
more than just raising money. The lengthy
duration of a city marathon allows for
observations
(continued on next page)2 Regional Review Q3 2002
Observations
continued from previous page
numerous interactions with enthusiastic crowds,
creating a forum for promoting the importance of
their cause. For athletes who have suffered a person-
al loss, the marathon is an opportunity to convert
emotional anguish into a physically challenging fight
against a disease. The long hours of team training
and race day fans form a social network of invalu-
able support to DFMC’s members. Both fundraising
and running a marathon are challenging tasks, yet
the two complement each other such that the mis-




Thank you for the article by Claudia Goldin and
Lawrence Katz on “The Shaping of Higher Education
in the United States and New England” (Q4 2001).
The data on public spending and enrollments by
state were particularly helpful. 
In citing the establishment of private colleges in
New England, however, Goldin and Katz did not
mention that many were formed by religious groups:
Harvard by Congregationalists, Boston University by
Methodists, Tufts by Universalists, Holy Cross and
Boston College by Jesuits, and Northeastern
University and Springfield College from the YMCA
movement. In addition, Harvard accepted state
appropriations for almost two centuries and was an
early prototype of a quasi-public college, designed to
provide preachers and teachers for church and state.
Economists rarely look at the influence of religion,
but even today 40 percent of college freshmen con-
sider “integrating spirituality into my life” as “essen-
tial” or “very important,” according to a survey
undertaken by UCLA and the American Council on
Education.
As to whether a philanthropist will ever again
have his or her name on a first-rate private college:
The Franklin W. Olin College of Engineering, in
Needham, Massachusetts, was established after a
1997 gift of $300 million from the foundation creat-
ed by F.W. Olin, of Olin Industries. It was designed
to be both first rate and free. Perhaps it’s still early
to rule out either Bill Gates or Ted Turner!
Joe Cronin
President of Bentley College, 1991–97
Secretary of Education, 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1971–75
Manufacturers should be liable
when computer bugs leave 
consumers in the lurch 
By David Banisar
in early june,Microsoft announced a serious flaw in a number of
its programs—including Internet Explorer, Messenger, and Chat—
that could allow a hacker to take control of a user’s computer to run
programs and access information. This was not the first such an-
nouncement by Microsoft this year of a major error in its programs,
nor is Microsoft alone in this problem. Every day thousands of com-
puters around the world are disabled or illegally entered because of
system and software flaws. At best, these bugs are minor nuisances.
But at worst, they open systems to viruses, denial of service attacks,
and manipulation by outsiders. The consequences include fraud, re-
lease of personal and proprietary information, and loss of business due
to downtime. A recent study by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology found that software bugs cost the U.S. economy near-
ly $60 billion each year.
There is no single reason for these problems, but the majority of se-
curity holes are due to poor programming and a lack of quality con-
trol. Systems and software manufacturers typically place far more em-
phasis on getting a new system out to market with more profitable
features than on ensuring that the system is satisfactorily error-free be-
fore it is released. The burden then falls on users to identify and track
bugs and fix them before they cause a system failure or are exploited
in cyberattacks. There is no other consumer product for which con-
sumers are expected to do so much to ensure product safety, and the
creators so little.
THE MISSING INVISIBLE HAND
The computer industry’s response is that the market should resolve the
issue. Users should select software based on its reliability, and the least
flawed programs will win. But thus far, market forces have not suc-
ceeded in improving software safety. Why? For many types
of software, consumers don’t have a real choice. Or-
acle, for instance, controls the market for enter-
prise database software, with three to four
times the market share of its nearest com-
petitors. Recently discovered bugs in
its purportedly “unbreakable” latest
release, Oracle 9i, did not prevent
the company from maintaining
this dominance. Its users, espe-
cially those with years of data on
its system, are so dependent on
its products that they have no
credible way to threaten Oracle
perspective